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Abstract
We investigate the presence (and the influence) of disinformation spreading on online
social networks in Italy, in the 5-month period preceding the 2019 European Parliament
elections. To this aim we collected a large-scale dataset of tweets associated to
thousands of news articles published on Italian disinformation websites. In the
observation period, a few outlets accounted for most of the deceptive information
circulating on Twitter, which was driven by controversial and polarizing topics of
debate such as immigration, national safety and (Italian) nationalism. We unraveled the
existence of an intricate network of connections between different disinformation outlets
across Europe, U.S. and Russia, which seemingly acted in a coordinated manner in the
period before the elections. Overall, the spread of disinformation on Twitter was
confined in a limited community, strongly (and explicitly) related to the Italian
conservative and far-right political environment, who seldom focused online discussions
on the up-coming elections.
Introduction
In recent times, growing concern has risen over the presence and the influence of
deceptive information spreading on social media [1]. The research community has
employed a variety of different terms to indicate the same issue, namely disinformation,
misinformation, propaganda, junk news and false (or ”fake”) news.
As people is more and more suspicious towards traditional media coverage, news
consumption has considerably shifted towards online social media; these exhibit unique
characteristics which favored, among other things, the proliferation of low-credibility
content and malicious information [1, 2]. Consequently, it has been questioned in many
circumstances whether and to what extent disinformation news circulating on social
platforms impacted on the outcomes of political votes [2–5].
Focusing on 2016 US Presidential elections, recent research has shown that false
news spread deeper, faster and broader than truth [6], with social bots and echo
chambers playing an important role in the diffusion of deceptive information [7, 8].
However, it has also been highlighted that disinformation only amounted to a negligible
fraction of online news [9–11], the majority of which were exposed to and shared by a
restricted community of old and conservative leaning people, highly engaged with
political news [9–11]. In spite of such small volumes, a study suggested that false news
(and the alleged interference of Russian trolls) played an important role in the election
of Donald Trump [2].
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For what concerns European countries, recent research has highlighted the impact
and the influence of social bots and online disinformation in different circumstances,
including 2016 Brexit [5], 2017 French Presidential Elections [4, 12] and 2017 Catalan
referendum [13]. A significant presence of junk news in online conversations concerning
2019 European elections has been recently reported across several countries [12,14–16].
For what concerns Italy, according to Reuters [17], trust in news is today particularly
low (40% in general, 23% on social media), as result of a long-standing trend which is
mainly due to the political polarization of mainstream news organizations and of the
resulting partisan nature of Italian journalism. Previous research on online news
consumption highlighted the existence of segregated communities [18] and explored the
characteristics of polarizing and controversial topics which are traditionally prone to
misinformation [19]. Remarkable exposure to online disinformation was highlighted by
authors of [20], who exhaustively investigated online media coverage in the run-up to
2018 Italian General elections; in particular, the study observed a rising trend in the
spread of malicious information, with a peak of interactions in correspondence with the
Italian elections. This result was later substantiated in a report of the Italian Authority
for Communications Guarantees (AGCOM) [21]. A contemporary work [22] has
collected electoral and socio-demographic data, relative to Trentino and South Tyrol
regions, as to directly estimate the impact of fake news on the 2018 electoral outcomes,
with a focus on the populist vote; this study argues that malicious information had a
negligible and non-significant effect on the vote. Furthermore, a recent investigation by
Avaaz [23] revealed the existence of a network of Facebook pages and fake accounts
which spread low-credibility and inflammatory content–reaching over a million
interactions–in explicit support of ”Lega”, ”Movimento 5 Stelle” and controversial
themes of debate such as immigration, national safety and anti-establishment. Those
pages were eventually shut down by Facebook as violating the platform’s terms of use.
In this work we focus on the 5-month period preceding 2019 European elections; we
pursue a consolidated setting, described in [8,24], for investigating the presence (and the
impact) of disinformation in the Italian Twittersphere. We recognize that our analysis
has a few inherent limitations: first, according to Reuters [17] Twitter is overtaken by
far by other social platforms, accounting for only 8% of total users (with a decreasing
trend) when it comes to consume news online compared to Instagram (13%), YouTube
(25%), WhatsApp (27%) and Facebook (54%), which exhibit instead a rising trend.
Second, these differences are even more accentuated when comparing with the U.S.
scenario [21], the focus of most of recent research. However, other aforementioned social
media offer today little opportunities to researchers to conveniently analyze the spread
of online information, given the limitations they impose on the acquisition of data and
the different user experiences they offer. Our study sheds light on the Italian
mechanisms of disinformation spreading, and thus the outcomes of the analysis indicate
directions for future research in the field.
To collect relevant data, we manually curated a list of websites which have been
flagged by fact-checking agencies for fabricating and spreading a variety of malicious
information, namely inaccurate and misleading news reports, hyper-partisan and
propaganda stories, hoaxes and conspiracy theories. Differently from [8], satire was
excluded from the analysis. Following literature on the subject [3, 7, 9–11], we used a
”source-based” approach, and assumed that all articles published on aforementioned
outlets indeed carried deceptive information; nonetheless, we are aware that this might
not be always true and reported cases of misinformation on mainstream outlets are not
rare [3]. Our analysis was driven by the following research questions:
RQ1: What was the reach of disinformation which circulated on Twitter in the run-up
to European Parliament elections? How active and strong was the community of
users sharing disinformation?
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Fig 1. Time series for the number of tweets, containing links to disinformation articles,
collected in the period from 07/01/2019 to 27/05/2019. We annotate it with some
events of interest.
RQ2: What were the most debated narratives of disinformation? How much were they
influenced by national vs European-scale topics?
RQ3: Who are the most influential spreaders of disinformation? Do they exhibit precise
political affiliations? How could we dismantle the disinformation network?
RQ4: Did disinformation outlets organize their deceptive strategies in a coordinated
manner? Can we identify inter-connections across different countries?
We first describe the data collection and the methodology employed to perform our
analysis, then we discuss each of the aforementioned research questions, and finally we
summarize our findings.
Methods
Data Collection
Following a consolidated strategy [7,8,24], we leveraged Twitter Streaming API in order
to collect tweets containing an explicit Uniform Resource Locator (URL) associated to
news articles shared on a set of Italian disinformation websites. As a matter of fact,
using the streaming endpoint allowed us to gather 100% of shared tweets matching the
defined query (see next).
To this aim we manually compiled a list of 63 disinformation websites that were still
active in January 2019. We relied on blacklists curated by local fact-checking
organizations (such as ”butac.net”, ”bufale.net” and ”pagellapolitica.it”); these include
websites and blogs which share hyper-partisan and conspiratorial news, hoaxes,
pseudo-science and satire. We initially started with only a dozen of websites, and we
successively added other sources; this did not alter the overall collection procedure.
For sake of comparison, we also included four Italian fact-checking and debunking
agencies, namely ”lavoce.info”, ”pagellapolitica.it”, ”butac.net”, ”bufale.org”.
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Fig 2. Time series for the number of shares on both Twitter (red) and Facebook (blue)
for two disinformation outlets, respectively ”byoblu.com” (left) and ”silenziefalsita.it”
(right), in the period from 07/01/2019 to 27/05/2019.
In accordance with current literature [6, 9–11,24] we use a ”source-based” approach:
we do not verify each news article manually but we assign the disinformation label to all
items published on websites labeled as such (the same holds for fact-checking articles).
In order to filter relevant tweets, we used all domains as query filter parameters
(dropping ”www”, ”https”, etc) in the form ”byoblu com OR voxnews info OR ...”
as suggested by Twitter Developers guide (https://developer.twitter.com). We
built a crawler to visit these websites and parse URLs as to extract article text and
other metadata (published date, author, hyperlinks, etc). We handled URL duplicates
by directly visiting hyperlinks and comparing the associated HTML content. We also
extracted profile information and Twitter timelines for all users using Twitter API.
The collection of tweets containing disinformation (see Fig 1) and fact-checking
articles was carried out continuously from January 1st (2019) to May 27th, the day
after EU elections in Italy. We collected 16867 disinformation articles shared over
354746 tweets by 23243 unique users, and 1743 fact-checking posts shared over 23215
tweets by 9814 unique users.
We can observe that, in general, articles devoted to debunk false claims were barely
engaged, accounting only for 6% of the total volume of tweets spreading disinformation
in the same period; such findings are comparable with the US scenario [8], and we leave
for future research an in-depth comparative analysis of diffusion networks pertaining to
the two news domains.
The entire data is available at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OQHLAJ
Comparison with Facebook
In order to perform a rough estimate of the different reach of disinformation on Twitter
compared to Facebook, we collected data relative to the latter platform regarding two
disinformation outlets, namely ”byoblu.com” and ”silenziefalsita.it”, which have an
associated Facebook page and are among Top 3 prolific and engaged sources of
malicious information (see Results).
We used netvizz [25] to collect statistics on the number of daily shares of Facebook
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posts published by aforementioned outlets, and we compared with the traffic observed
on Twitter. As we can see in Fig 2, disinformation has a stronger reach on Facebook
than Twitter, for both sources, throughout the observation period; this is also observed
by other sources [20, 21, 23], coherently with the Italian consumption of social news. An
in-depth analysis of the Italian disinformation on Facebook would be required, but it
needs suitable assistance from Facebook for what concerns the disinformation diffusion
network.
Network analysis
Building the re-tweeting diffusion network
We built a global diffusion network–corresponding to the union of all re-tweeting
cascades associated to articles gathered in our dataset–following a consolidated
strategy [7, 8]. For each tweet we add nodes and edges differently according to the
action(s) performed by users:
• Tweet: a basic tweet corresponds to originally authored content, and it thus
identifies a single node (author).
• Mention: whenever a tweet of user a contains a mention to user b, we build an
edge from the author a of the tweet to the mentioned account b.
• Reply: when user a replies to user b we build an edge from a to b.
• Retweet: when user a retweets another account b, we build an edge from b to a.
• Quote: when user a quotes user b the edges goes from b to a.
When processing tweets, we add a new node for users involved in aforementioned
interactions whenever they are not present in the network. As a remark, a single tweet
can contain simultaneously several actions and thus it can generate multiple nodes and
edges. Finally, we consider edges to be weighted, where the weight corresponds to the
number of times two users interacted via actions mentioned beforehand.
Building the network of websites
In order to investigate existing inter-connections within different disinformation
websites, and to understand the nature of external sources which are usually mentioned
by deceptive outlets, we searched for URLs in all articles present in our dataset, i.e.
which were shared at least once on Twitter. We accordingly built a graph where each
node is a distinct Top-Level Domain–the highest level in the hierarchical Domain Name
System (DNS) of the Internet–and an edge is built between two nodes a and b whenever
a has published at least an article containing an URL belonging to b domain; the weight
of an edge corresponds to the number of shared tweets carrying an URL with an
hyperlink from a to b. The final result is a directed weighted network of approximately
5k nodes and 8k edges. We used networkx Python package [26] to handle the network.
Main core decomposition, centrality measures and community detection
In our analysis we employed several techniques coming from the network science
toolbox [27], namely k-core decomposition, community detection algorithms and
centrality measures. We used networkx Python package to perform all the
computations.
The k-core [28] of a graph G is the maximal connected sub-graph of G in which all
vertices have degree at least k. Given the k-core, recursively removing all nodes with
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degree k allows to extract the (k + 1)-core; the main core is the non-empty graph with
maximum value of k. k-core decomposition can be employed as to uncover influential
nodes in a social network [8].
Community detection is the task of identifying communities in a network, i.e. dense
sub-graphs which are well separated from each other [29]. In this work we consider
Louvain’s fast greedy algorithm [30], which is an iterative procedure that maximizes the
Newman-Girvan modularity [31]; this measure is based on randomizations of the
original graph as to check how non-random the group structure is.
A centrality measure is an indicator that allows to quantify the importance of a node
in a network. In a weighted directed network we can define the In-strength of a node as
the sum of the weights on the incoming edges, and the Out-strength as the sum of the
weights on the out-going edges. Betweenness centrality [32] instead quantifies the
probability for a node to act as a bridge along the shortest path between two other
nodes; it is computed as the sum of the fraction of all-pairs shortest paths that pass
through the node. PageRank centrality [33] is traditionally used to rank webpages in
search engine queries; it counts both the number and quality of links to a page to
estimate the importance of a website, assuming that more important websites will likely
receive more links from other websites.
Time series analysis
In statistics, a trend analysis refers to the task of identifying a population characteristic
changing with another variable, usually time or spatial location. Trends can be
increasing, decreasing, or periodic (cyclic). We used the Mann-Kendall statistical
test [34, 35] as to determine whether a given time series showed a monotonic trend. The
test is non-parametric and distribution-free, e.g. it does not make any assumption on
the distribution of the data. The null hypothesis H0, no monotonic trend, is tested
against the alternative hypothesis Ha that there is either an upward or downward
monotonic trend, i.e. the variable consistently increases or decreases through time; the
trend may or may not be linear. We referred to mkt Python package.
In statistics, the multiple testing problem occurs when considering simultaneously a
set of statistical tests, each of which can potentially produce a discovery when rejecting
a null hypothesis. In this case is desirable to have confidence level for the whole family
of simultaneous tests, e.g. requiring a stricter significance value for each individual test.
We define the family-wise error rate (FWER) as the probability of rejecting at least one
true alternative hypothesis, i.e. at least one type I error. We use the Bonferroni
correction to control the FWER at ≤ α by testing each individual hypothesis at a
significance level of α/m where α is the desired alpha level (overall) and m is the
number of hypotheses.
Ethics statement
We do not need ethical approval as data was publicly available and collected through
Twitter Streaming API; we do not infringe Twitter terms and conditions of use.
Results and discussion
Assessing the reach of Italian disinformation
Sources of disinformation
To understand the reach of different disinformation outlets, we first computed the
distribution of the number of articles and tweets per source. We observed, as shown in
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Fig 3. A (Top). The distribution of the total number of shared articles per website.
B (Bottom). The distribution of the total number of associated tweets per website.
We show Top-11 (which account for over 95% of the total volume of tweets), and we
aggregate remaining sources as ”Others”.
Fig 3, that a few websites dominate on the remaining ones both in terms of activity and
social audience.
In particular, with approximately 200k tweets (over 50% of the total volume) and 6k
articles (about 1/3 of the total number), ”voxnews.info” stands out on all other sources;
this outlet spreads disinformation spanning several subjects, from immigration to
health-care and conspiratorial theories, and it runs campaigns against fact-checkers as
well as labeling its articles with false ”fact-checking” labels as to deceive readers.
Interestingly, two other uppermost prolific sources such as ”skynew.it” and
”tuttiicriminidegliimmigrati.com” do not receive the same reception on the platform; the
former has stopped its activity on March and the latter is literally–it translates as ”All
the immigrants crimes”–a repository of true, false and mixed statements about
immigrants who committed crimes in Italy.
We can also recognize three websites associated to public Facebook pages that have
been recently banned after the investigation of Avaaz NGO, namely ”jedanews.it”,
”catenaumana.it” and ”mag24.es”, as they were ”regularly spreading fake news and hate
speech in Italy” violating the platform’s terms of use [23].
We further computed the distribution of the daily engagement (the ratio
no.articles published/no.tweets shared per day) per each source, noticing that a
few sources exhibit a considerable number of social interactions in spite of fewer
associated tweets, compared to uppermost ”voxnews.info”. We show the time series for
the daily engagement of Top-10 sources, which account for over 95% of total tweets, in
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Fig 4. Daily engagement for Top-10 sources (ranked according to the total number of
shared tweets). The Mann-Kendall test (upward trend at significance level 0.005) was
accepted only for ”byoblu.com”.
Fig 4. We can notice in particular that ”byoblu.com” exhibits remarkable spikes of
engagement w.r.t to a very small number of total tweets compared to other outlets,
whereas ”mag24.es” shows a suspiciously large number of shares in the month preceding
the elections (and after the release of Avaaz report).
We excluded ”ilprimatonazionale.it” from this analysis as it was added only at the
end of April (we collected around 30k associated tweets and less than 1000 articles);
official magazine of ”CasaPound” (former) neo-fascist party–with style and
agenda-setting that remind of Breitbart News–it exhibits a daily engagement of over 200
tweets, exceeding all other websites .
As elections approached, we were interested to understand whether there were
particular trends in the daily reception of different sources. Focusing on Top-10 sources
(except ”ilprimatonazionale.it”) we performed a Mann-Kendall test to assess the
presence of an upward or downward monotonic trend in the time series of (a) daily
shared tweets and (b) daily engagement. Taking into account Bonferroni’s correction,
the test was rejected at α = 0.05/10 = 0.005; both (a) and (b) exhibit an upward trend
for ”byoblu.com” alone, whereas the remaining sources are either stationary or
monotonically decreasing. As this outlet strongly supported euro-skeptical positions
(and often gave visibility to many Italian representatives of such arguments) we argue
that in the run-up to the European elections its agenda became slightly more
captivating for the social audience.
User activity
For what concerns the underlying community of users sharing disinformation, we first
computed the distribution of the number of shared tweets and unique URLs shared per
number of users, noticing that a restricted community of users is responsible for
spreading most of the online disinformation. In fact, approximately 20% of the
community (∼4k users) accounts for more than 90% of total tweets (∼330k), in
accordance with similar findings elsewhere [8–10]. Among them, we identified accounts
officially associated to 18 different outlets (we manually looked at users’ profile
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description and usernames); they overall shared 8310 tweets.
We also distinguished five classes of users based on their generic activity, i.e. the
number of shared tweets containing an URL to disinformation articles: Rare (about
9.5k users) with only 1 tweet; Low (about 8k users) with more than 1 tweet and less
than 10; Medium (about 3k users) with a number of tweets between 11 and 100; High
(about 500 users) with more than 100 tweets but less than 1000; Extreme (exactly 20
users) with more than 1000 shared tweets. About 1 user out of 5 shared more than 10
disinformation articles in five months.
As shown in Fig 5A, we can notice that a minority of very active users (the ensemble
with High and Extreme activity) accounts for half of the deceptive stories that were
shared, and over 3/4 of the total number of tweets was shared by less than 4 thousand
users (Medium, High and Extreme activity).
We overall report 21124 active (20 of which are also verified), 800 deleted, 124
protected and 112 suspended accounts. Verified accounts were altogether involved in
5761 tweets, only 18 of which in an ”active” way, i.e. a verified account actually
authored the tweet. We observed that they were mostly called in with the intent to
mislead their followers, adding deceptive content on top of quoted statuses or replies.
Next we inspected the distribution of the number of users concerning their
re-tweeting activity, i.e. the fraction of re-tweets compared to the number of pure
tweets; this is strongly bi-modal, and it reveals that users sharing disinformation are
mostly ”re-tweeters”: more than 60% of the accounts exhibit a re-tweeting activity
larger than 0.95 and less than 30% have a re-tweeting activity smaller than 0.05. This
shows that a restricted group of accounts is presumably responsible for conveying in the
first place disinformation articles on the platform, which are propagated afterwards by
the rest of the community.
We computed the distribution of some user profile features, namely the count of
followers and friends, the number of statuses authored by users and the age on the
social platform (in number of months passed since the creation date to May 2019). We
report that users sharing disinformation are tendentiously quite ”old” and active on the
platform–with an average age of 3 years and more than a thousand authored statuses.
We were able to gather information via Twitter API only for active and non-protected
users.
We further inspected recently created accounts, noticing that approximately a
thousand user was registered during the collection period, i.e. the last six months; they
show similar distributions of aforementioned features compared to older users. Overall
(see Fig 5A) they mostly pertain to active classes (Medium and High) and they account
for 15% (around 18k tweets) of the total volume of tweets considered–which lowers to
approximately 288k tweets excluding those authored by non-active, suspended and
protected accounts. Furthermore, about a hundred exhibit abnormal activities,
producing more than 10k (generic) tweets in the period preceding the elections and
directly sharing more than 10 disinformation stories each. We performed a
Mann-Kendall test to the time series of daily tweets shared by such users (see Fig 5B),
assessing the presence of a monotonically increasing trend (at significance level
α = 0.05). The main referenced source of disinformation is ”voxnews.info” with more
than 60% (circa 12k tweets) of the total number of shared stories. An activity of this
kind is quite suspicious and could be further investigated as to detect the presence of
”cyber-troops” (bots, cyborgs or trolls) that either attempted to drive public opinion in
light of up-coming elections (via so-called ”astroturfing” campaigns [36]) or simply
redirected traffic as to generate online revenue through advertisement [1–3].
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Fig 5. A (Top). A breakdown of the total volume of tweets according to the activity
of users. Fractions of users created in the six months before the elections are indicated
with lighter shades (percentages not shown for reasons of space); these account
respectively for 0.18% (Rare), 0.6% (Low), 2.04% (Medium) and 2.98% (High) of total
tweets. B (Bottom). The distribution of daily tweets shared by recently created users.
The agenda-setting of disinformation
Topic analysis
For what concerns the narratives of different disinformation outlets, we investigated
their agenda relative to the resulting audience on Twitter, thus looking at the titles of
articles that were shared at least once. We focus on titles as they usually pack a lot of
information about their claims in simple and repetitive structures [37]; besides, the
exposure to mild attacks such as the presence alone of misleading titles on users’
timelines could affect ordinary beliefs and result in a resistance to opposite
arguments [38].
We avoided automatic topic modeling algorithms [39] as they are not suitable for
small texts. Therefore, we employed two volunteers to manually compile a list of
keywords associated to four distinct topics namely: Politics/Government (PG),
Immigration/Refugees (IR), Crime/Society (CS), Europe/Foreign (EF); these categories
were obtained inspecting Top-500 most frequent words appearing in the titles and
taking into account relevant events that occurred in the last months.
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Fig 6. A stacked-area chart showing the distribution of different topics over the
collection period. The daily coverage on themes related to Immigration/Refugees and
Europe/Foreign is stationary, whereas focus on subjects related to Crime/Society and
Politics/Government is monotonically increasing towards the elections (end of May
2019).
In particular, PG refers to main political parties and state government (e.g.
”salvini”, ”pd”, ”m5s”, ”conte”) as well as the main political themes of debate (e.g.
”reddito”, ”banche”, ”decreto”). IR includes references to immigration, refugees and
hospitality (e.g. ”immigrati”, ”profughi”, ”ong”, ”porti”) whereas CS includes terms
mostly referring to crime, minorities and national security (e.g. ”rom”, ”mafia”,
”polizia”). Finally EF contains direct references to European elections and foreign
countries (e.g. ”euro”, ”macron”, ”onu”). It is worth mentioning that the most frequent
keyword was ”video” (which does not belong to any specific topics), proving that a
remarkable fraction of disinformation was shared as multimedia content.
We computed the relative presence of each topic in each article (we use ”OTHER”
to indicate the reach of articles that do not contain any of the keywords associated to
aforementioned topics) and accordingly assessed their distribution across tweets over
different months. We can observe in Fig 6 that the discussion was stable on
controversial topics such immigration, refugees, crime and government, whereas focus on
European elections and foreign affairs was quite negligible throughout the period, with
only a single spike of interest at the beginning of January corresponding to the quarrel
between Italian and France prime ministers. We also performed Mann-Kendall test to
assess the presence of any monotonic trends in the daily distribution of different topics;
we rejected the test for α = 0.05/5 = 0.01 for IR and EF whereas we accepted it for the
remaining topics, detecting the presence of an upward monotonic trend in CS and PG,
and a downward monotonic trend in OTHER.
In the observation period, the disinformation agenda was well settled on main
arguments supported by leading parties, namely ”Lega” and ”Movimento 5 Stelle”,
since 2018 general elections; this suggests that they might have profited from and
directly exploited hoaxes and misleading reports as to support their populist and
nationalist views (whereas ”Partito Democratico” appeared among main targets of
misinformation campaigns); empirical evidence for this phenomenon has been also
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Fig 7. Top 10 hashtags per number of shared tweets (blue) and unique users (orange).
widely reported elsewhere [20,22]. However, the electoral outcome confirmed the
decreasing trend of ”Movimento 5 Stelle” electoral consensus in favor of ”Lega”, which
was rewarded with an unprecedented success.
Differently from 2018 [20] we in fact observed one main cited leader: Matteo Salvini
(”Lega” party). This is consistent with a recent report on online hate speech [40],
contributed by Amnesty International, which has shown that his activity (and
reception) on Twitter and Facebook is 5 times higher than Luigi Di Maio (leader of
”Movimento 5 Stelle”); not surprisingly, his main agenda focuses (negatively) on
immigration, refugees and Islam (which generated most of online interactions in
2018 [20]), which are also the main objects of hate speech and controversy in online
conversations of Italian political representatives overall.
It appears that mainstream news actually disregarded European elections in the
months preceding them, focusing on arguments of national debate [41]; this trend was
also observed in other European countries according to FactCheckEU [42], claiming that
misinformation struggled to dominate online conversations mainly because European
elections are extremely un-polarised and not very interesting compared to national
elections. We believe that this might have affected the agenda-setting of disinformation
outlets, which are in general susceptible to traditional media coverage [43], thus
explaining the focus on different targets in their deceptive strategies.
Usage of hashtags
Among most relevant hashtags shared along with tweets–in terms of number of tweets
and unique users who used them (see Fig 7)–a few indicate main political parties (cf.
”m5s”, ”pd”, ”lega”) and others convey supporting messages for precise factions, mostly
”Lega” (cf. ”salvininonmollare”, ”26maggiovotolega”); some hashtags manifest instead
active engagement in public debates which ignited on polarizing and controversial topics
(such as immigrants hospitality, vaccines, the Romani community and George Soros).
We also found explicit references to (former) far-right party ”CasaPound” and the
associated ”Altaforte” publishing house, as well as some disinformation websites (with a
remarkable polarization on ”criminiimmigrati” which was shared more than 5000 times
by only a few hundred accounts).
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Fig 8. The cloud of words for Top 50 most frequent hashtags embedded in the users’
profile description.
We also extracted hashtags directly embedded in the profile description of users
collected in our data, for which we provide a cloud of words in Fig 8. The majority of
them expresses extreme positions in matter of Europe and immigration: beside explicit
references to ”Lega” and ”Movimento 5 Stelle”, we primarily notice euro-skeptical (cf.
”italexit”, ”noue”), anti-Islam (cf. ”noislam”) and anti-immigration positions (cf.
”noiussoli”, ”chiudiamo i porti”) and, surprisingly enough, also a few (alleged) Trump
followers (cf. ”maga” and ”kag”). The latter finding is odd but somehow reflects the
vicinity of Matteo Salvini and Donald Trump on several political matters (such as
refugees and national security). On the other hand, we also notice ”facciamorete”,
which refers to a Twitter grassroots anti-fascist and anti-racist movement that was born
on December 2018, as a reaction to the recent policies in matter of immigration and
national security of actual Italian establishment.
Relevant spreaders of disinformation
Central users in the main core
In order to identify most influential nodes in the diffusion network, we computed the
value of several centrality measures for each account. We show in Table 1 the list of
Top-10 users according to each centrality measure, and we also indicate whether they
belong or not to the main K-core of the network [28]; this corresponds to the sub-graph
of neighboring nodes with degree greater or equal than k = 48, which is shown in Fig 9.
We color nodes according to the communities identified by the Louvain
modularity-based community algorithm [30] run on the original diffusion network (over
20k nodes and 100k edges).
Despite centrality measures do not generally agree in their ranking, we can notice
that the majority of nodes with highest values of In-Strength, Out-Strength and
Betweenness centralities belongs also to the main K-core of the network; the same does
not hold for users which have a large PageRank centrality value. A few users strike the
eye:
1. matteosalvinimi is Matteo Salvini, actual leader of the far-right wing ”Lega”
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Table 1. List of Top-10 users according to different centrality measures, namely
In-strength, Out-Strength, Betweenness and PageRank; we indicate with a cross nodes
that do not belong to the main K-core (k=48) of the network.
Rank In-Strength Out-Strength Betweenness PageRank
1 napolinordsud × Filomen30847137 IlPrimatoN IlPrimatoN
2 RobertoPer1964 POPOLOdiTWlTTER matteosalvinimi matteosalvinimi
3 razorblack66 laperlaneranera Filomen30847137 Sostenitori1 ×
4 polizianuovanaz × byoblu byoblu armidmar
5 Giulia46489464 IlPrimatoN a meluzzi Conox it ×
6 geokawa petra romano AdryWebber lauraboldrini ×
7 Gianmar26145917 araldoiustitia claudioerpiu pdnetwork ×
8 pasqualedimaria × max ronchi razorblack66 libreidee ×
9 il brigante07 Fabio38437290 armidmar byoblu
10 AngelaAnpoche claudioerpiu Sostenitori1 × Pontifex it ×
party and vice-prime minister of the Italian Parliament; he is not an active
spreader of disinformation, being responsible for just one (true) story coming from
disinformation outlet ”lettoquotidiano.com” (available at
https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1102654128944308225),
which was shared over 1800 times. He is generally passively involved in deceptive
strategies of malicious users who attempt to ”lure” his followers by attaching
disinformation links in replies/re-tweets/mentions to his account.
2. a_meluzzi is Alessandro Meluzzi, a former representative of centre-right wing
”Forza Italia” party (affiliated to Silvio Berlusconi); he is a well-known supporter
of conspiracy theories and a very active user in the disinformation network, with
approximately 400 deceptive stories shared overall.
3. Accounts associated to disinformation outlets, namely IlPrimatoN with
”ilprimatonazionale.it”, byoblu with ”byoblu.com”, libreidee with
”libreidee.org”, Sostenitori1 with ”sostenitori.info” and Conox_it with
”conoscenzealconfine.it”.
A manual inspection revealed that most of the influential users are indeed actively
involved in the spread of disinformation, with the only exception of matteosalvinimi
who is rather manipulated by other users, via mentions/retweets/replies, as to mislead
his huge community of followers (more than 2 millions). The story shared by Matteo
Salvini underlines a major issue with disinformation outlets identified in this analysis:
they often publish simple true and factual news as to bait users and expose them to
other harmful and misleading content present on the same website.
Besides, we identified a few influential users who represented the target of several
disinformation campaigns:
1. lauraboldrini is Laura Boldrini, representative of left-wing ”Liberi e Uguali”
party and actual member of the Italian Parliament; in the last few years she has
been repetitively a target of fake news.
2. pdnetwork is the account of the centre-left ”Partito Democratico” party; as the
former ruling party it has been severely attacked in the propaganda of both actual
ruling parties (”Lega” and ”Movimento 5 Stelle”).
3. Pontifex_it is the account of Papa Francesco; due to his recent statements in
favor of immigration he has become another target of Italian far-right online
hateful speech.
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Fig 9. The main K-core (k = 48) of the re-tweeting diffusion network. Colors
correspond to different communities identified with the Louvain’s algorithm. Node size
depends on the total Strength (In + Out) and edge color is determined by the source
node.
We also report a suspended account (polizianuovanaz), a protected one
(Giulia46489464) and a deleted user (pasqualedimaria).
In addition, we investigated communities of users in the main K-core–which contains
218 nodes (see Fig 9)–and we noticed systematic interactions between distinct accounts.
We manually inspected usernames, most frequent hashtags and referenced sources,
deriving the following qualitative characterizations:
1. the Green community corresponds to ”Lega” party official accounts:
matteosalvinimi and legasalvini, whereas the third account, noipersalvini,
belongs to the same community but does not appear in the core.
2. the Red community represents Italian far-right supporters, with several
representatives of CasaPound (former) party (including his secretary
distefanoTW who does not appear in the core), who obviously refer to
”ilprimatonazionale.it” news outlet.
3. the Yellow community is strongly associated to two disinformation outlets,
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namely ”silenziefalsita.it” (SilenzieFalsita) and ”jedanews.it” (jedasupport);
the latter was one of the pages identified in Avaaz report [23] and deleted by
Facebook.
4. the Orange community is associated to the euro-skeptical and conspiratory outlet
”byoblu.com” (byoblu), and it also features Antonio Maria Rinaldi (a_rinaldi),
a well-known euro-skeptic economist who has just been elected with ”Lega” in the
European Parliament.
5. the Purple community corresponds to the community associated to
”tuttiicriminidegliimmigrati.com” (TuttICrimin) disinformation outlet.
6. the remaining Blue (Filomen30847137), Light-blue (araldoiustitia) and
Brown communities (petra_romano) represent different groups of very active
”loose cannons” who do not exhibit a clear affiliation.
Eventually, we employed Botometer algorithm [44] as to detect the presence of social
bots among users in the main core of the network. We set a threshold of 50% on the
Complete Automation Probability (CAP)–i.e. the probability of an account to be
completely automated–which, according to the authors, is a more conservative measures
that takes into account an estimate of the overall presence of bots on the network;
besides, we computed the CAP value based on the language independent features only,
as the model includes also some features conceived for English-language users. We only
detected two bot-like accounts, namely simonemassetti and jedanews, respectively
with probabilities 58% and 64%, that belong to the same Purple community. A manual
check confirmed that the former habitually shares random news content (also
mainstream news) in an automatic flavour whereas the latter is the official spammer
account of ”jedanews.it” disinformation outlet.
Dismantling the disinformation network
Similar to [8], we performed an exercise of network dismantling analysis using different
centrality measures, as to investigate possible intervention strategies that could prevent
disinformation from spreading with the greatest effectiveness.
We first ranked nodes in decreasing order w.r.t to each metric, plus the core
number–the largest k for which the node is present in the corresponding k-core–and the
In and Out-degree, which exhibited the same Top 10 ranking as their weighted
formulation (Strengths), but they do entail different results at dismantling the network.
Next we delete them one by one while tracking the resulting fraction of remaining edges,
tweets and unique articles in the network.
We observed that eliminating a few hundred nodes with largest values of Out-Degree
promptly disconnects the network; these users in fact account alone for 90% of the total
number of interactions between users. For what concerns the number of tweets sharing
disinformation articles, the best strategy would be to target users with largest values of
In-Strength who, according to our network representation, are likely to be users with a
high re-tweeting activity; in fact, confirming previous observations, a few thousand
nodes account for more than 75% of the total number of tweets shared in the five
months before the elections. However, as shown in Fig 10, it is more challenging to
prevent users to be exposed from even a tiny fraction of disinformation articles, as the
network exhibits an almost linear relationship between the number of users disconnected
and the corresponding number of remaining stories; as such you would need to curb the
entire network as to completely block the spread of malicious information.
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Fig 10. Results of different network dismantling strategies w.r.t to remaining unique
disinformation articles in the network. The x-axis indicates the number of disconnected
accounts and the y-axis the fraction of remaining items in the network.
Coordinated strategies of deception
To investigate existing connections between different disinformation outlets and other
external sources, we first analyzed the network of websites with a core
decomposition [28], obtaining a main core (k = 14) which contains 35 nodes as a result
of over 75.000 external re-directions via hyperlinks (shown in Fig 11A). Over 99% of the
articles includes a hyperlink in the body. We may first notice frequent connections
between distinct disinformation outlets, suggesting the presence of shared agendas and
presumably coordinated deceptive tactics, as well as frequent mentions to reputable
news websites; among them we distinguish ”IlFattoQuotidiano”, which is a historical
supporter of ”Movimento 5 Stelle”, and conservative outlets such as ”IlGiornale” and
”LiberoQuotidiano” which lean instead towards ”Lega”. We also observe that most of
the external re-directions point to social networks (Facebook and Twitter) and video
sharing websites (Youtube); this is no wonder given that disinformation is often shared
on social networks as multimedia content [1, 3]. In addition, we inspected nodes with
the largest number of incoming edges (In-degree) in the original network, discovering
among uppermost 20 nodes a few misleading reports originated on dubious websites
(such as ”neoingegneria.com”), flagged by fact-checkers but that were not included in
any blacklist. We believe that a more detailed network analysis could reveal additional
relevant connections and we leave it for future research.
Furthermore, we focused on the sub-graph composed of three particular classes of
nodes, namely Russian (RU) sources, EU/US disinformation websites and our list of
Italian (IT) outlets; we manually identified notable Russian sources (”RussiaToday” and
”SputnikNews” networks) and we resorted to notable blacklists to spotlight other
EU/US disinformation websites–namely ”opensources.co”, ”de´codex.fr”, the list
compiled by Hoaxy [24] and references to junk news in latest data memos by
COMPROP research group [12,14–16].
The resulting bipartite network–we filtered out intra-edges between IT sources to
better visualize connections with the ”outside” world–contains over 60 foreign websites
(RU, US and EU) and it is shown in Fig 11B.
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Fig 11. Two different views of the network of websites; the size of each node is
adjusted w.r.t to the Out-strength, the color of edges is determined by the target node
and the thickness depends on the weight (i.e. the number of shared tweets containing an
article with that hyperlink).
A (Left). The main core of the network (k = 14); blue nodes are Italian disinformation
websites, green ones are Italian traditional news outlets, red nodes are social networks,
the sky-blue node is a video sharing website and the pink one is an online encyclopedia.
B (Right). The sub-graph of Russian (orange), EU (olive green), US (violet) and
Italian (blue) disinformation outlets.
We observe a considerable number of external connections (over 500 distinct
hyperlinks present in articles shared more than 5 thousand times) with other countries
sources, which were primarily included within ”voxnews.info”, ”ilprimatonazionale.it”
and ”jedanews.it”. Among foreign sources we encounter several well-known US sources
(”breitbart.com”, ”naturalnews.com” and ”infowars.com” to mention a few) as well as
RU (”rt.com”, ”sputniknews.com” and associated networks in several countries), but we
also find interesting connections with notable disinformation outlets from France
(”fdesouche.com” and ”breizh-info.com”), Germany (”tagesstimme.com), Spain
(”latribunadeespana.com”) and even Sweden (”nyheteridag.se” and ”samnytt.se”).
Besides, a manual inspection of a few articles revealed that stories often originated in
one country were immediately translated and promoted from outlets in different
countries (see Fig 12). Such findings suggest the existence of coordinated deceptive
strategies which span across several countries, consistently with claims in latest report
by Avaaz [23] which revealed the existence of a network of far-right and anti-EU
websites, leading to the shutdown of hundreds of Facebook pages with more than 500
million views just ahead of the elections. Far-right disinformation tactics comprised the
massive usage of fake and duplicate accounts, recycling followers and bait and switch of
pages covering topics of popular interest (e.g. sport, fitness, beauty).
It is interesting that Facebook decided on the basis of external insights to shutdown
pages delivering misleading content and hate speech; differently from the recent
past [3, 7, 8] it might signal that social media are more willing to take action against the
spread of deceptive information in coordination with findings from third-party
researchers. Nevertheless, we argue that closing malicious pages is not sufficient and
more proactive strategies should be followed [3, 23].
Finally, we performed a Mann-Kendall test to see whether there was an increasing
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Fig 12. An example of disinformation story who was published on a Swedish website
(”friatider.se”) and then reported by an Italian outlet (”voxnews.info”). Interestingly,
this news is old (July 2018) but it was diffused again in the first months of 2019.
trend, towards the elections, in the number of external connections with US and RU
disinformation websites; we rejected it at α = 0.05/2 = 0.0025.
Conclusions
We studied the reach of Italian disinformation on Twitter for a period of six months
immediately preceding the European elections (RQ1) by analyzing the content
production of websites producing disinformation, and the characteristics of users sharing
malicious items on the social platform. Overall, thousands of articles–which included
hoaxes, propaganda, hyper-partisan and conspiratorial news–were shared in the period
preceding the elections. We observed that a few outlets accounted for most of the
deceptive information circulating on Twitter; among them, we also encountered a few
websites which were recently banned from Facebook after violating the platform’s terms
of use. We recognized a heterogeneous yet limited community of thousands of users who
were responsible for sharing disinformation. The majority of the accounts (more than
75%) occasionally engaged with malicious content, sharing less than 10 stories each,
whereas the remaining users played an active role in the spreading, with a few hundred
accounts posting alone a few thousand articles.
We then studied the most debated narratives of disinformation (RQ2) by inspecting
news items. We observed that they mostly concern polarizing and controversial
arguments of the local political debate such as immigration, crime and national safety,
whereas discussion around the topics of Europe global management had a negligible
presence throughout the collection period; the lack of European topics was also reported
in the agenda-setting of mainstream media.
We then identified the most influential accounts in the diffusion network resulting
from users sharing disinformation articles on Twitter (RQ3), so as to detect the
presence of active groups with precise political affiliations. We discovered strong ties
with the Italian far-right and conservative community, in particular with ”Lega” party,
as most of the users manifested explicit support to the party agenda through the use of
keywords and hashtags. Besides, a common deceptive strategy was to passively involve
his leader Matteo Salvini via mentions, quotes and replies as to potentially mislead his
audience of million of followers. We also observed that disabling a limited number of
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central users in the network would promptly interrupt to a certain extent the spread of
disinformation circulating on Twitter, but it would immediately raise censorship
concerns.
Finally, we investigated inter-connections within different deceptive agents (RQ4),
thereby uncovering an intricate network of inter-connections within different deceptive
agents, seemingly acted in a coordinated manner during the period preceding the
elections. We in fact discovered many cases where the same (or similar) stories were
shared in different languages across different European countries, as well as U.S. and
Russia.
This analysis confirms that disinformation is present on Twitter and that its
spreading is not neutral, in terms of topics being discussed and of political affiliation of
the key members of the information spreading community. Note, however, that the
main disinformation news have a higher share on Facebook than Twitter and that the
use of Twitter in Italy as a social channel is small compared to other social sources such
as Facebook, WhatsApp or Instagram; a comparable study on disinformation spreading
is most needed also for these other channels.
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